FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

Similarly on Android, WhatsApp suggests unencrypted backups to Google Drive by default.

Putting on my tinfoil hat, I am pretty sure that Google/Apple/Meta have some deal (successor to PRISM) where end-to-end encrypted messaging is tolerated as long as they have defaults that make it possible to access chats anyway. Apple not enabling ADP by default and WhatsApp doing Google Drive backups that are not end-to-end encrypted is the implementation. Since most people just use the defaults, it undermines security of people who care.

It's a 'win-win', the tech companies can wash their hands in innocence, the agencies get access to data, and phone users believe that they are chatting in a secure/private manner.

At least on my iPhone the default is to preview messages only when unlocked [0]. This user went out of their way to show previews in a locked state which meant it was vulnerable by digital acquisition without unlock code.

[0] https://files.catbox.moe/3gwjoy.png

Worse than that, they did not take advantage of the ability to send that message data as an encrypted payload inside the notification.

https://blog.davidlibeau.fr/push-notifications-are-a-privacy...

Either do not include sensitive user data inside a notification by default, or encrypt that data before you send it to the notification server.

https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Chat#Recommendation

That’s been my go-to and I’ve yet to see it not work.

WTF. This is super simple stuff.

Critical distinction, as merely changing OS notification settings will simply prevent notification content from being displayed on-screen.

Settings > Notifications > Messages > Show

The Defaults have to be the most sensitive ones.

If you are a supposed super secure app, this should be the default.

Settings > Notifications > Show preview

      HOURS=6
      EPOCH_DIFF=978307200
      SINCE=$(echo "$(date +%s) - $EPOCH_DIFF - $HOURS * 3600" | bc)

      sqlite3 ~/Library/Group\ Containers/group.com.apple.usernoted/db2/db \
        "SELECT r.delivered_date, COALESCE(a.identifier, 'unknown'), hex(r.data)
        FROM record r
        LEFT JOIN app a ON r.app_id = a.app_id
        WHERE r.delivered_date > $SINCE
        ORDER BY r.delivered_date ASC;" \
      | while IFS='|' read -r cfdate bundle hexdata; do
          date -r $(echo "$cfdate + $EPOCH_DIFF" | bc | cut -d. -f1) '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S'
          echo "  app: $bundle"
          echo "$hexdata" | xxd -r -p > /tmp/notif.plist
          plutil -p /tmp/notif.plist 2>/dev/null \
            | grep -E '"(titl|title|subt|subtitle|body|message)"' \
            | sed 's/^  */  /'
          echo "---"
      done

In recent years, filesystem paths for system services have started to converge for both macOS and iOS so I'm thinking with jailbreak you could get read access to that database and get the same data out of it.

But this is a reminder that these centralized notification infrastructure (FCM and APNs) store notification content (if the app is told to send content in it - signal with option enabled wouldn't send content) even if we clear local history these middleman still hold it

Android > Settings > Notifications > Manage > Notification History

“We learned that specifically on iPhones, if one’s settings in the Signal app allow for message notifications and previews to show up on the lock screen, [then] the iPhone will internally store those notifications/message previews in the internal memory of the device,” a supporter of the defendants who was taking notes during the trial told 404 Media

The default setting appears to be to only show notification preview when unlocked. Will that notification still be stored unencrypted in notification storage or is it in an encrypted store because it will preview after unlock?

It makes sense that any notification that previews on the lock screen would be unencrypted (including the case where it is encrypted but the encryption key is adjacently stored).

This all reads to me that this was a user induced OPSEC issue and Signal had the right defaults.

[0] https://archive.is/bSQhD#selection-619.0-622.0

But it was really useful each time I did not see a notification in time.

Edit: typo

Why does any software keep asking you to do things you explicitly told them you don't want to do? Because it's in the software developer's best interest to get you to do them, not yours. We've gotten way past the point in software where we no longer expect the software to serve the user's interest and solve the user's problems. Now, the expectation is that the user gets nagged and coerced into serving the software's interest and solving the developers' problems.

EDIT: Looks like a developer confirmed this in a sibling comment already: It nags you because that solves their support problem.

The case comes with a long statement about the Antifa “organization”. Just your weekly reminder we are living under an Orwellian administration. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/antifa-cell-members-convicted...

I'm not sure precisely how the NAND controller responds to requests for raw data from blocks with "deleted" data. And if this would require decapping the flash.

Some flash will happily let you see the data and delay erasing it.

Generally flash is non deterministic about when blocks even those with entirely stale data are erased . It might be years before the block is reused due to wear leveling algorithms and it might retain data that entire time.

Here's hoping the controller for phones which hold sensitive data are more active

Even worse, whatever critical settings you may set as a sophisticated user will frequently be reset, or changed, or re-organized under different settings… And of course, set back to insecure defaults… With subsequent software updates.

This is a regular occurrence with Firefox and privacy settings.

Whatever the actual impetus is, we should act as if this is intentional.

If you don't know how to disable it, you use your favorite search engine / LLM / knowledgeable relative to find out, and disable it.

But if you just didn't pay attention, "never thought about it", you don't care about security, and no amount of technical means would help, sorry.

"However, it appears Apple's system uses a default setting which, in turn, seemingly allowed it to store the defandant's content in Apple's database"

instead of

"However, it appears the defendant did not have that setting enabled which, in turn, seemingly allowed the system to stoire the content in the database"

In the later version, the defendant, namely his inaction in not changing a default setting, appears solely responsible for the outcome. And the actor that placed a copy of his incoming messages in a database that the actor created is referred to as "the system", not the corporation that wrote the system and sold the computer with this system pre-instaalled

I couldn't believe this so went to look up some data on this.

Holy FUCK that is bleak. There needs to be way more computer education, not just "how2type" classes.

If piping encrypted content resulted in a plaintext notification then you'd have a right to be concerned.

1. On android if Google Play isn't available (or you install the no Google apk version) it'll use a websocket for notifications. Apple doesn't allow a persistent connection except through their own notification framework.

2. In either case Signal doesn't send message contents through the notification framework (not even encrypted). Once Signal receives a notification the app wakes up and reaches out to the signal service directly for actual encrypted message.

3. Regardless when signal shows the contents of your message in the notification menu of your device your device keeps a record on your device of that message content.

The FBI here didn't get anything from apple, once they had the apple device unlocked they looked at the notification database on the device to get the message contents. This isn't really any different from the fact that if the FBI has your unlocked phone they can read your signal messages. The notable bit is that the notification database retains messages even after the app is deleted.

You can send push notifications with your own encryption on top, which I believe Signal does, so Apple can't see it on the APNS side, but your local extension to decrypt the content is still subject to the user's settings, and part of the notification history if you put message content in the notification.

“Messages were recovered from Sharp’s phone through Apple’s internal notification storage—Signal had been removed, but incoming notifications were preserved in internal memory. Only incoming messages were captured (no outgoing).”

ie the messages recovered were 1. incoming 2. stored by the OS after decryption

i also was spooked by the headline :p

[0] https://mastodon.world/@Mer__edith/111563865413484025

I also get that in Texas they are fine "criminalizing" protesting, but that's just part of its hyper-authoritarian "charm", and a lot of us don't think that protesting in itself should be criminal.

Personally, it's a moral good to free people from a concentration camp, even if it requires violence to do so. However it's also obvious that when you oppose a State, you get hit with terrorism charges. ...unless you're a jan6er, of course.

The article you're commenting on is about people who obviously would have wanted this disabled, but didn't have it disabled, presumably because they didn't know about this issue.

I've found other ways Signal can leak information, even with disappearing messages. It's not the total install-and-be-done privacy screen that some people think it is, and requires a little effort at the user end to fill in a few gaps.

Personally I'd be in favor of a hard app store policy, that if an app notifies you about something, all the importantdetails (like full message text) must be included - specifically to allow the user to view the important information without having to open the app itself.