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#apple#notifications#notification#signal#app#ios#messages#device#end#message

Discussion (64 Comments)Read Original on HackerNews

dlcarrier•about 3 hours ago
This was a bug that left it cached on the device. Apple and Google have put themselves in the middle of most notifications, causing the contents to pass through their servers, which means that they are subject to all the standard warrantless wiretapping directly from governments, as well as third-party attacks on the infrastructure in place to support that monitoring.

If you don't want end-to-end messages made available to others, set your notifications to only show that you have a message, not what it contains or who its from.

gruez•about 2 hours ago
> Apple and Google have put themselves in the middle of most notifications, causing the contents to pass through their servers, which means that they are subject to all the standard warrantless wiretapping directly from governments, as well as third-party attacks on the infrastructure in place to support that monitoring.

>If you don't want end-to-end messages made available to others, set your notifications to only show that you have a message, not what it contains or who its from.

This incorrect on two counts:

1. As per what you wrote immediately before the quoted text, the issue was that the OS keeps track of notifications locally. Google/Apple's notification servers have nothing to do with this

2. It's entirely possible to still have end-to-end messaging even if you're forced to send notifications through Google/Apple's servers, by encrypting data in the notification, or not including message data at all. Indeed that's what signal does. Apple or Google's never sees your message in cleartext.

mdavidn•about 2 hours ago
You are correct, but you omitted one complication: Clients trust Google's and Apple's servers to faithfully exchange the participants' public keys.
pcl•about 2 hours ago
[delayed]
ls612•about 2 hours ago
Isn’t that what Contact Key Verification solves? Or do I misunderstand how that works?
asteroidburger•about 2 hours ago
Both Apple and Google offer the ability for your app to intercept and modify messages before being displayed. Use that to send encrypted messages and decrypt them there, using your own code on the user’s device.
asdfman123•about 2 hours ago
Seems like you should use an app like Signal for anything sensitive at all so you don't have to worry about megacorp ecosystems as much.
jdwithit•about 2 hours ago
As mingus88 said, this story is literally in response to Apple leaking messages sent through Signal. Doesn't matter if the message is securely transmitted if the operating system then keeps it lying around in plain text in a cache.

From the linked article:

> The independent news outlet reported that the FBI had been able to extract deleted Signal messages from someone’s iPhone using forensic tools, due to the fact that the content of the messages had been displayed in a notification and then stored inside a phone’s database — even after the messages were deleted inside Signal.

mingus88•about 2 hours ago
Nope, Signal messages were stored in the phones notification DB even after the app was deleted

https://www.404media.co/fbi-extracts-suspects-deleted-signal...

ryanisnan•about 2 hours ago
This is also an oversimplification. If I understand the issue correctly, the notification with the message contents was what was cashed locally and then accessed. This same vulnerability would exist with Signal if you had the notifications configured to display the full message contents. In this case, it has nothing to do with either Apple or Signal.
6thbit•about 3 hours ago
The "bug" discussed in the article is only part of the problem.

The main problem, which is notifications text is stored on a DB in the phone outside of signal, is not addressed. To avoid that you have to change your settings.

In this case, the defendant had deleted the signal app completely, and that likely internally marks those app's notifications for deletion from the DB, so the bug fixed here is that they were not removing notifications from the local database when the app that generated them was removed, now they do.

  Impact: Notifications marked for deletion could be unexpectedly retained on the device
  Description: A logging issue was addressed with improved data redaction.
  CVE-2026-28950
They classify this as "loggging issue" so it sounds like notifications were not actually in the database itself but ended up in some log.
modeless•about 3 hours ago
Oh, I was originally confused about this because I had thought the push notifications were end-to-end encrypted, so they couldn't be cached in readable form by the push notification service, and only decrypted by the app on device upon receiving the notification. But it seems like after the notification was decrypted by the app and shown to the user using OS APIs, the notification text was was then stored by the OS in some kind of notification history DB locally on the device?
pixel_popping•about 3 hours ago
In privacy circles, this was always known, as Google/Apple often sends notification content to their servers (which means that it bypass the App realm).

Some people talking about it (different but in the same scope of issue): https://blog.davidlibeau.fr/push-notifications-are-a-privacy...

massel•about 3 hours ago
I expect that Signal encrypts the notification data prior to sending it to Apple, then decrypts it on-device using a Notification Service Extension – this is a common pattern to avoid trusting Apple with any sensitive data.

That would mean Apple stored the cleartext on-device after decryption.

eggnet•about 2 hours ago
Signal doesn’t provide anything in the message other than… “there are pending messages.” Signal wakes up, fetches them, then generates notifications on the phone itself.
rvnx•about 3 hours ago
+ Messengers like Snapchat and WhatsApp;

despite "end-to-end" encryption (for WhatsApp) they are sending copy of some messages based on keywords to authorities, PRISM-like.

Officially to protect kids, but who knows what is in this keywords list.

6thbit•about 3 hours ago
in the case reported the content did not leave the device. feds retreived them directly from the phone.
nxobject•about 3 hours ago
Note that Signal offers the option to use generic “You’ve received messages” notifications - it’s good practice in general.
sunnybeetroot•about 3 hours ago
So does every app, go to iOS settings > notifications shows previews > never.
rvnx•about 3 hours ago
Most likely changes the preview on the client-side, but the message is still full on the server-side
Barbing•about 3 hours ago
Is setting it from Signal directly more trustworthy?

Or maybe it’s impossible for iOS to store the preview content if it never showed in the first place, but not sure if it’s even documented.

elashri•about 3 hours ago
I wish it can be disabled for particular apps and not an all or nothing situation.
Barbing•about 3 hours ago
Can be!

Settings > Apps > choose an app > Lock Screen Appearance: Show Previews - Never

bradyd•about 2 hours ago
That setting is available for each individual app.
varun_ch•about 2 hours ago
This makes me wonder: Cellebrite makes tools for law enforcement to break into iPhones, likely exploiting weaknesses/vulnerabilities. Does Apple buy Cellebrite’s tools and reverse engineer them? Or would they not have a way of acquiring them legally?
saagarjha•about 1 hour ago
Cellebrite sells their lower-level devices to Apple directly for things like data transfer at Apple Stores. The ones above that are unlikely to be sold to Apple.
tredre3•10 minutes ago
> Cellebrite sells their lower-level devices to Apple directly for things like data transfer at Apple Stores.

Please substantiate that claim. Why would Apple need mystical third party devices to transfer data? They've designed both the user devices and the software, and they're both capable of exchanging data, and I'm sure Apple can do even more once they put the devices in diagnostic mode. What am I missing? What is Cellebrite providing here?

bilbo0s•about 2 hours ago
I bet Apple has access to Mythos now.

Not saying they should use it to reverse engineer hacking tools.

Just saying they have access to Mythos now.

nozzlegear•about 1 hour ago
Oh boy, Anthropic's special marketing moneymaker model that's supposedly too dangerous for us mere mortals. Big whoop.
itopaloglu83•about 3 hours ago
Thankfully Apple backported the fix the iOS 18 as well.
ilikepi•about 2 hours ago
Not only that, but iOS 18.7.8 actually seems to be available to devices capable of running iOS 26 without any workarounds, unlike 18.7.3 through .6. It makes me wonder if those intermediate releases really were supposed to be available but weren't due to some issue on the distribution side that no one bothered to fix.
itopaloglu83•about 2 hours ago
I think that was another attempt by Apple to push users to iOS 26, but after seeing how many people with compatible devices refuse to upgrade, they finally caved in and provided an update.
skrtskrt•about 2 hours ago
It's not new that push notifications should be presumed to be insecure, with their content passing through - and probably persisted - outside the app sandbox and anything in control of in-app encryption.

Apple should have fixed this long ago (not that you can trust a closed system), but Signal should also have strong guardrails & warnings around allowing message content in push notifications.

lynndotpy•about 2 hours ago
Heads up. They have released an iOS 18 update (good!) but, and please bear the caps:

UPDATING IOS WILL ENABLE AUTOMATIC UPDATES TO IOS 26.

(Bad!) This is a new shady tactic they're using trying to get iOS 18 users to install iOS 26.

layer8•about 2 hours ago
This was already the case for 18.7.7. However, after turning automatic updates off in 18.7.7, after updating to 18.7.8 it remained off (reproducibly on several devices I updated). Maybe there is a one-time flag that is set so that after turning off automatic updates after having been turned on automatically, they aren't automatically turned on again on subsequent updates.
lynndotpy•31 minutes ago
Huh, my experience was the opposite. I don't think Apple undid my setting with iOS 18.7.7, but they did with iOS 18.7.8.
jim33442•about 2 hours ago
Avoid iOS 26 at all costs. I was forced to update to it because I needed to factory reset my phone, and it's super buggy. I'm not even one of those people harping on the Liquid Glass design decisions, those are w/e, the problem is just that the phone routinely freaks out doing basic tasks like trying to open the camera app or close the keyboard. They should roll it back.
xmx98•about 2 hours ago
Thanks for the warning!
maerF0x0•about 3 hours ago
Cat and Mouse, good. This is the adversarial setup that results in a better outcome for all.
cubefox•about 2 hours ago
It is completely unclear from this article whether this means Apple does no longer cache dismissed notifications somewhere.
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unethical_ban•about 3 hours ago
I wonder if the same flaw exists on Android/GrapheneOS.
tcfhgj•about 2 hours ago
bug or backdoor?
ashishb•about 1 hour ago
This has nothing to do with Apple/Firebase notification service.

It has to do with the fact that any notification displayed on your device goes via a separate system service which was caching them.

It is amusing to see how often people confuse device notifications with Apple notification service.

aucisson_masque•about 1 hour ago
> This was because notifications that displayed the messages’ content were also cached on the device for up to a month.

Why can't we have notification history just like on Android then. It's very useful when you dismiss a notification you didn't want to, or you look for some old stuff.