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Discussion (42 Comments)Read Original on HackerNews
I have been interested in using GrapheneOS but hesitant about actually getting a Pixel phone. Used phone prices are usually >$300 even for "a" series unless I go back several generations. Whether the device bootloader can be unlocked is also a question. I am definitely not ready to spend $449 on a new Pixel 10a.
So a VPN isn't a VPN on Android? Regardless of this bug. Do other locked down operating systems act the same?
Mullvad and others reported on that one ages ago
It's a concern to me, because humans often extend their trust to computer trust based upon misunderstanding of the identically spelled words and lack of recognition of differing context.
I'm surprised they honored the embargo at that point, and delayed the fix until May. Why not just release immediately?
Google's Pixel hardware division likely operates at a loss - or breaks even.
and even if every active HN user bought $100-$400 used Pixels from Swappa, meaningless money to them.
Step one… completely reform MBA programs.
If you patch it, you'd need to find another way to de-anonymize those users.
I feel like this should be toward the top of the terms of service for the phone, even above the mandatory arbitration clause.
What planet are you from?
1. A new (albeit "hidden" [2]) network API registerQuicConnectionClosePayload(fd, payload) lets a process set any byte array for the OS to send on its behalf.
2. No ("panaroid networking") permission checks against the calling uid/process when sending that byte array out on a OS-owned UDP socket.
3. Bypassing ("panaroid android") permission checks [3] by simply calling network-related syscalls (or libc/bionic functions) as opposed to Android SDK APIs.
These steps essentially amount to app sandbox escape (2,3) and privilege escalation (1,2). I am utterly confused why the Android security team at Google won't take this more seriously.
[0] https://lowlevel.fun/posts/tiny-udp-cannon-android-vpn-bypas...
[1] https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35152-android-always-on-vpn...
[2] In as much the code mmap'd into your own process can be "hidden" away. For their exploit though, the author cleverly abuses Binder IPC primitives to reach the "hidden" parts.
[3] This bypass probably only works for this one scenario because of #2.