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#openbsd#rust#security#https#kernel#find#linux#more#bug#patch

Discussion (33 Comments)Read Original on HackerNews

Tiberium•about 1 hour ago
Seems to be found as a part of Patch The Planet [0] which is basically OpenAI giving model access and Trail of Bits using them to find vulnerabilities in OSS projects.

[0] https://openai.com/index/patch-the-planet/

john_strinlai•43 minutes ago
neat, i'm a big fan of trail of bits but apparently missed this announcement. here's their post: https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/06/22/introducing-patch-th... and a summary of week 1: https://gist.github.com/patch-the-planet/69fd1aa925c8e73edea...
tiffanyh•22 minutes ago
Can anyone find the mailing list thread on this topic (or does it not exist because @security are private mailing list)?

I did find another use-after-free bug from a couple months ago on the mailing list:

https://marc.info/?t=177581065500002&r=1&w=2

uticus•about 1 hour ago
> Only two remote holes in the default install, in a heck of a long time!

https://www.openbsd.org/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenBSD#Security_record

anonym29•about 1 hour ago
LPE (to root) is serious, but it's not a remote hole.
Arubis•about 1 hour ago
OpenBSD's security stance being the stuff of legend, I'm curious how many vulns have been found over the last couple months while the big model companies are flaunting their ability to find exploits. It'd be super cool to see it remain tiny.
wahern•42 minutes ago
According to https://openai.com/index/patch-the-planet/

Linux: 24 LPEs, plus many additional vulnerabilities.

OpenBSD: 1 LPE.

FreeBSD: 7 LPEs, plus many additional vulnerabilities.

Not sure what that says, though. Perhaps the models are more likely to find Linux issues because of the training.

_flux•13 minutes ago
I wonder how many of the Linux the LPEs are related to drivers, which I understand there are more of..
dcrazy•18 minutes ago
Or Linux development is significantly more active.
ori_b•15 minutes ago
This is an external audit. Why would Linux activity make a difference here? Are you theorizing that the churn causes bugs?
ectospheno•44 minutes ago
The commit logs over the last few months have highlighted when an issue was found by a program. They usually name the submitter and the tool.
mmooss•13 minutes ago
I think of it more as their attention to quality in their code:

Given the 'quality' of most code, especially under commercial pressure, it's no surprise that much more effective tools will find many more vulnerabilities. Did OpenBSDs quality approach work in this respect?

jsiepkes•about 1 hour ago
If this is a local privilege escalation to root, why can't I find anything on https://www.openbsd.org/security.html ?
justthehuman•27 minutes ago
Best guess, from the commit message alone[0]: It was fixed as a bug, at the time they didn't have evidence it could lead to LPE

The AI security tool then, retroactively discovered that it could have been used for LPE.

Again, just my guess I could be wrong.

[0] https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/1957873d2063db11dab780...

stackghost•24 minutes ago
OpenBSD has a reputation for being... selective about what they admit is a security-relevant bug.
seethishat•4 minutes ago
They appreciate technical correctness and they do not exaggerate. Most 'security researchers' are not technically correct and they exaggerate a lot (seeking fame and all).

Dismissing their claims is not being selective, it's just the right thing to do.

poly2it•42 minutes ago
Would Rust have made this issue impossible by construction? I know Linus has spoken about Rust's promises about memory safety not being equivalently applicable in the kernel domain, so I would be curious to hear any kernel developer's perspectives.
klodolph•22 minutes ago
Rust is designed to make this type of issue impossible, but that assumes that you can correctly encode object lifetimes in the kernel in a way that allows the compiler to check them.

So I would say that any easy answer like “this would not compile” would just be a guess, because you would want to know more of the particulars in order to answer this question.

I know that this is kind of a non-answer, but if you want to write a kernel in Rust you have to figure out boundaries for where unsafe {} are. In a kernel, there are probably large chunks of unsafe {} and the Rust compiler prevents certain bugs outside unsafe {} assuming there aren’t bugs inside unsafe {} that would prevent the type checker from doing its job correctly.

rwaksmunski•24 minutes ago
The Rust ownership model prevents use after free. This type of a bug would not compile.
anoneng•9 minutes ago
Not necessarily. Rust safety relies on OS primitives and the error here is in an OS primitive itself (kernel semaphores).

Yes Rust is one language that can be widely deployed in systems programming and potentially avoid classes of memory and ownership errors. No it doesn’t magically solve all the problems. Saying “Rust would fix this” in a hypothetical situation where Rust existed in 1995 or OpenBSD was rewritten from scratch, ok, well maybe. As of today only research kernels and a very small fraction of Linux systems have been written in Rust when we are talking about kernels.

People without systems and embedded programming experience need to sit down.

dezgeg•6 minutes ago
I don't think this is about core kernel semaphores but rather the SysV semaphore system calls?
_flux•11 minutes ago
You might not be able to express the ownership in the way that can be checked statically, so quite possibly this would then be downgraded to a runtime error (that could be handled with a panic)—but not undefined behavior.
skydhash•16 minutes ago
I’m not an OS programmer and have been dabbling with OpenBSD’s code for fun. But the fact is that Rust kinda lacks flexibility. Most of the OS is dedicated to building a beautiful lie for programs to run happily, and that’s where C shine.

I shudder to think about the amount of work that it would take to convince the rust compiler that everything is all right. Most hardware interactions is “parse, don’t validate” which means you’ll be pinky-swearing to the compiler.

And for my cursory glances at the code, most structures are handled well, that it’s mostly logic bug (from bad data) instead of bad memory access (which can happen).

bitwize•35 minutes ago
"'Nothing could have prevented this from happening,' say users of only language where this happens" comes to bite OpenBSD.
amiga386•7 minutes ago
OpenBSD wouldn't say anything like that. They're well aware of the 40+ year old codebase's limitations, but accept it because they're not so stupid as to "rewrite it in <other language>" which will bring a million bugs.

They've innovated again and again in the security space and aggressively bring in new security features like pf, OpenSSH, W^X enforcement, pledge(), arc4random(), ASLR, so many other things.

Unlike, say, NPM, which can't even replicate existing packaging systems like yum or apt, and has been plagued with security flaws despite being built entirely out of a memory-safe language. Quite an achievement.

anoneng•17 minutes ago
Tell us you know nothing about kernel programming and trust stacks while you are at it.
applfanboysbgon•23 minutes ago
The OpenBSD project was started in 1995, with ancestry going back further than that. Should they have first invented Rust? Or at what point do you suppose the decades-old codebase should have been completely rewritten?
gjvc•about 1 hour ago
from the link:

sys/kern/sysv_sem.c in OpenBSD through 7.9 has a use-after-free allowing local privilege escalation to root. This is a context switch use-after-free after tsleep in sys_semget().

iberator•about 1 hour ago
Blasphemy
znpy•43 minutes ago
and yet...
IveSeenItAll•20 minutes ago
Oh, hey, a local-user-to-root exploit on OpenBSD. Cool! Those are rare, but not unheard of, unless you're talking about Windows or Linux, where you don't hear much about this bug class, just since it's common-as-rainfall.

Anyway... Does this mean OpenBSD is suddenly less interesting? Nope, it's still pretty much the best-understandable general-purpose OS, ready for your RiiR fork. So, still go for that! Burn a universe or two worth of tokens! For the planet!

Does this mean OpenBSD is suddenly less secure? Nah... Its practical security level was never that much higher than that of its nominal competitors, despite Theo's best attempts, the best of which were replicated elsewhere and majority of it went ignored. The first class counts as "innovations", the rest as "experiments" which, no matter what anyone thinks, is not the same as "failed innovations."

But I digress. Now, go and donate to OpenSSH (because I bet you typed ssh today, didn't you, you rascal?), publish your OxidizedBSD fork, or whatever. Just don't link to that "is OpenBSD secure?" site, because, well, gauche, dude(tte)!