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Discussion (90 Comments)Read Original on HackerNews
Microsoft has the backing of many governments, and has access to the best legal teams possible, leaving this guy in a world of hurt.
Microsoft seems to have brought this on themselves by creating a complex and user-hostile bug reporting system. It seems to me that they could have offered this person a job or a contract, because Eclipse has been amazingly effective at uncovering high-severity exploits.
Also, Eclipse could have approached various governments offering the exploits for sale, because a lucrative market exists for such things, assuming they aren't already in the NSA portfolio. Lots of above-board companies do the same thing.
Quotes in this article blame Eclipse for the damage, but the blame should really rest with Microsoft. Eclipse is apparently just one person using an AI framework. Microsoft has vastly more resources to discover and fix problems with their products, but they never seem to do it themselves.
So something went down really bad on their side.
Just dump it anon or sell it, don't even try to claim a bounty or get a cve. Without elaborating, they will make sure you regret it
Same goes for games. If you find RCE, report it and move on. If it remains unfixed let a journalist know. Do NOT accept their invite to the studio, they want to have you arrested. Would have happened to me were it not for one dude with a conscience at the company warning me not to go
Naturally there are other kinds of bugs as well.
However reducing 70% of root causes, saves a bunch of money already.
> “It confusingly claims their program ‘ensures researchers are compensated and publicly acknowledged’ in a statement answering a researcher who says he got neither,”
Well said.
Feeling consequences are how they are kept in line. Maybe next time they will think twice before (allegedly) treating a person like they did here, as well as the creative reasoning I recall them using in the past to reduce payouts.
It's a wonder anyone even reports things to Microsoft anymore because of this. They have a long habit of declaring things as intentional, then silently patching it after.
That said, I feel bad for the inevitable victims of exploitation and also I am certain he will end up criminalized or as per usual the law will enforce a large corps will against him.
Yes. Definitely a Friday night after a hard week take.
DMCA has exemptions for "good faith" security research, whatever that means when interpreted by a judge. Outside of copyright law, not sure what Microsoft could pursue legally. The researcher is just disclosing information. CFAA doesn't apply because it's an operating system, running on their own machine there's no unauthorized access there.
They could drag Eclipse through civil lawsuits though.
But yeah, zero sympathy for Microsoft here from me. They deserve it and what's coming for them, whatever that may be. Consider it karma for their past abuses.
The right thing is immediate publication of all exploits, zero liability for the researcher who's just doing a public service and maximum liability for the corporation whose criminal negligence enabled the exploits to begin with.
We have way too much fuck around these days and not nearly enough find out.
Microsoft could have prevented this. They were warned. It's their own fault.
The exploit exists whether or not the researcher reports it. They didn't make the exploit.
This is important to remember, in this situation and all other 0-day disclosures. There's also no guarantee that the uses of said 0 day after disclosure are the only time its been actively exploited. The exploit was already existing, and there are plenty of three letter agencies and Israeli companies that could very well have already been aware of them.
The only place blame belongs here is on Microsoft, no where else.
In my experience, corps sometimes behave this way not because it's the 'corporate intent' but simply due to internal politics and ass-covering by individual middle managers. MSFT's response is puzzling because it doesn't clear up anything nor does it try to de-escalate. It's also not the sort of completely neutral statement made when you need to respond but have nothing to say yet. This statement implies the researcher is a bad actor while also being vaguely threatening. I can't imagine any way this benefits MSFT.
It appears more like a junior exec trying to manage the optics so it looks like their department isn't in the wrong. This ass-covering accomplishes nothing for MSFT. Even if the researcher was demanding payment for a vuln and wasn't producing sufficient justification for their demand or wasn't following the process, this isn't a productive response. It sounds more like a manager is worried what their boss thinks. The manager acting this way is bad but the root cause is often the manager's upline creating a context where managers feel they need to ass-cover and stage manage optics.
The denial of Microsoft is just as harmful as the exploits of these flaws.
Amazon stock goes up when AWS bugs take down the entire internet, because everyone realizes that more of the internet depends on Amazon than they thought.
But nobody can buy PUTs at 2am on a saturday morning? You should buy PUTs on a friday before close then dump the exploits no?
All it takes is one wrong person to be assigned as a report comes in, a person who doesn't understand the real value of a bounty program, or one person having a bad day to completely ruin a company's reputation. It seems like that might have happened here (of course MS has done this before so who knows if it'll matter in the end).
Microsoft needs to be completely transparent and to do so immediately. They should, with the reporters permission, release all communications. They can exclude technical details if patches aren't available yet. Doing anything less is going to prevent a lot of people from using their bounty program in the future and we'll all be worse off for it. They almost certainly made a mistake and they need to own up to it.
If that's the case at Microsoft, something is absurdly wrong.
I am not saying humans or AI can create "perfect" software, but NASA has shown there is a HUGE gap between what can be achieved and what commercial software has generally done. We have given software a pass on the liability for the damage it can caused when it is defective for too long, that's the only way to change this, it must hit the bottom line.
It sounded like it really could have been a backdoor, that was complicated enough to not be an easy replacement to roll out without being detected, so Microslop tried to shut down the discovery as soon as possible, annoyed the wrong researcher and now they're at risk of really having to remove their back door to an administration that is not exactly understanding.
so far as i can tell yellowkey is problematic, as the exploit takes advantage of a backdoor that ms needs, to "manage" your computer.
only recently has a OOB mitigation been offered
https://www.techspot.com/news/112410-security-researcher-mic...
It does look like an intentional backdoor. The way ms is responding to it is even more suspicious.
Pretty funny since this defeats security on most corporate laptops, so impact is huge. You'd expect them to treat the reporter better and fix the issue fast...
I'm curious why they put it in, I'm not sure I understand the 'to "manage" your computer' note.
Microsoft should have no reason to put something like this in. So either they were forced or they had some engineers that did this on their own without any oversight.
The attack works by having an NTFS log get replayed against another partition than the one the log is stored on.
Sending the right signals to unlock Bitlocker in TPM-only mode is a necessity for recovery operations. Managing to replace the executable launched post verification is a plausible attack vector.
The weird thing is why it's possible to put the corrupting transactions on a different disk than the one being updated.
In theory I think it would be possible that it's a combination of "all recovery partitions share the same FS identifier and are verified before transaction playback" (it is a pre-packaged WIM file after all) and "the transaction log stores the FS identifier of the partition the changes are meant for", but in my opinion the latter part is a very weird architecture to choose.
If this is a backdoor, I appreciate how clever they were hiding it. If this is a bug, the person who discovered it probably has a whole lot more ready to publish.
Obfuscated enough to pass internal reviews, sloppy enough to make it look like a bug.
Other reply makes it even more suspicious... change is new in a subsystem that hasnt been updated in a long tine and it's only present in recovery mode files.
Microsoft handle of this also screams it's not a regular bug and they're likely investigating or someone is trying to cover their ass.
What's even more troubling is that the fix would be a very simple/quick rollback of the change that introduced this... and that they haven't done that is interesting.
i dont know how much fiddling around you may have done to make a win11 install local and secure, but but if you dont get it right the first time, most often the next update will involve re-installation of bloatkrapp.
the in house usage is apparently to allow bypass of bitlocker by the winRE recovery environment.
this has been exploited for some time already, allowing malicious uses of trustedinstaller ACL.
ive had to deal with persistent installs using exactly this route, and a really nasty one will brick your machine if you dont knock out its components in proper sequence pwning the trusted installer account, and disabling the viral recovery mechanism.
source:
Over the course of my career I've had to deal with multiple hacks, DDOSes, and even situations working with the FBI. It's a mess, and extremely frustrating and unfair to those of us who are just trying to do a good job and make a living. Those of you who are throwing stones at Microsoft's coding, how confident are you that your code is safe from this new AI age?
Obviously MS handled this poorly, even after reading this article it's not clear how MS handles bug bounties. But that doesn’t mean this “researcher” deserves a pass.
Releasing 0-days, especially working exploit code for unpatched vulnerabilities, is extremely unethical. It has real potential to cause a lot of harm to regular engineers, and users who had nothing to do with the dispute.
You are assuming it is not already being actively exploited and there will be a timely response to fix it, which is why we have these ticking clocks.
That Microsoft releases vulnerable software isn't the issue (that's a known quality at this point), it's their lack of transparency and refusal to hold themselves accountable.
did they start to do that at some point, or is this a pressure (blackmail?) campaign to get the to do that? I have no love for, but rather hate for, Microsoft, so I'm not suggesting blackmail in the sense of defending them, but it's something they could claim.
this is on Microsoft's website, they don't promise much for CVD
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/cvd
Instead they have a reputation for telling researchers that their disclosure isn’t actually a vulnerability and doesn’t qualify for a bounty or recognition, then quietly patching said non-vulnerability with a suspicious degree of urgency.
Rejected, then quietly fixed a couple of months later.
Precisely. /Your/ customers. I have no obligation to them and you profit handsomely from them. I'm not sure you can use "opposition" as a strategy to ameliorate your own negligence followed by inaction.
Not much has changed at Microsoft
Still trying to blame others for its own incompetence
Maybe Microsoft should spend less energy threatening researchers and more on not shipping the slop code in the first place.
They spent billions trying to build this open source and developer friendly image to just burn it all over $200,000 of unpaid security bounties.
Microsoft is a dumpster fire.
https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/TPM-sniffing
The best way would be to arguably keep the key completely off the TPM and use remote attestation. There's some preboot products out there like WinMagic SecureDoc* that use a little Linux partition, spin up just enough to get a network connection up to a remote server, provide authentication services, and then send the Bitlocker key down, unlock the partition, and chainload onwards to Windows.
* I acquired an enterprise device on eBay and was VERY surprised to find this product on it as the preboot protector. Zero way to crack in from my end, so I applaud it. There's even some MFA solutions they offer around this! https://winmagic.com/en/solutions/mfa-windows-login/
You can create a key or similar attribute which has an unlock policy based on those PCR values. If you play back the log of PCR write events from first principles (the log can be captured for debug purposes), you'll put the TPM into the same state and should be able to use anything protected by the respective policy.
For attestation, I presume you're thinking about sending an attested PCR quote - in that case, the TPM uses a non-extractable key to sign the current PCR states. As you can put the PCRs into the "correct" state, you'd be able to get a signed attestation the system is in that state.
the concept is to shield the TPM its bus, and any keys whith the CPU chip.
no sniffing would be possible after Pluton chips, even if you could decrypt.
but as i said, for now you can still sniff.
GitHub bans security researcher who posted zero-day Windows exploits
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48315968
I hope the promise of a July 14th threat goes as planned. They need to hurt. And everyone needs to see the risks they are taking by using their products.
It’s widely known how much Microsoft cooperates with three letter agencies. I think they are in a bind on how to act in these situations. They don’t want to acknowledge or fix the 0-day vulnerabilities because they don’t know if those are in use via state sponsored operations. Either they deal with customer fallout or they deal with the grief from their agency liaisons that they interrupted a multi-year operation by fixing the 0-day.
Vulnerability researchers really should avoid reporting to Microsoft and just sell them instead.
Microsoft is making all indications that it is behaving like a colossal dick. It’s not a good look. As always: if you find yourself in a deep hole, stop digging.
Part of me thinks they are welcoming this drama because if the other 0-days are genuine bugs then it muddies the water and shifts the focus away from a the fact that they shipped an intentionally backdoored security product.
Usually, when an individual is that upset, the group or corporation is wrong and tries to shape public perception by lying.
Since when is publishing zero days a crime anyway? Shame on Microslop for these intimidation tactics. The real crime is vibe coding operating systems.