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#model#reasoning#models#traces#distillation#same#user#key#don#trace

Discussion (62 Comments)Read Original on HackerNews

niemandhier12 minutes ago
You cannot steal what is not owned.

At least in the EU there is no copyright for LLM outputs, so I guess all they might do is violate the terms of service.

cyanydeez2 minutes ago
they also can't claim to be the owner of the output either because they can't claim to have had a valid license for the inputs.
Groxxabout 2 hours ago
>We take a trace produced by a frontier model, replay it into a weaker sibling, jailbreak the weaker model, ...

Ha! I've been wondering if replaying across models would work, ever since https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2026/05/29/fooling-...

I'm honestly rather curious if this was intentionally allowed, it's the sort of validation that's easy to miss (particularly if you're wading into the vibe waters). Seems like something that'd be absolutely riddled with possibilities for shenanigans.

sandeepkdabout 1 hour ago
I believe its a result of chasing the speed and happy path. The intent was to make the data available for reuse on the backend side for the same user session, it kind of makes sense. Making it available across the models is most likely by design.

The flaw is that the data is not strictly tied to user session, making the session data hijacking a lot easier.

1. Its a security issue.

2. Publicly available sessions make it much worse

yojoabout 2 hours ago
If you didn’t allow it, you wouldn’t be able to change models in the same conversation, as key parts of the context would be lost.

Wouldn’t surprise me if the providers just remove that ability and lock the model once the conversation starts.

myworkaccount2about 1 hour ago
There seems to be an obvious choice to make here, should you give the users to decrypt and use the COT that they did not generate themselves?

This is only required if you want users to be able to share things with everyone and you are going for the simplest implementation.

If not you could try to keep a record of keys associated with a user, then when a new request comes in look through to see if the user has a valid key to decrypt the COT.

For explicit shares, just add the key used in that one conversation to the users valid keys. For global shares use the global keys. But that's adding more complexity to the system.

aix1about 1 hour ago
I really don't understand why server-side storage of the trace isn't a viable approach here, with only a unique key flowing to the client and back. Does it have something to do with how backend load-balancing works?
amluto6 minutes ago
Makes no difference. There is a policy as to whether to allow use of a reasoning trace in a given context. Whether that trace originates from authenticated ciphertext or a backend database is basically irrelevant.
sandeepkdabout 1 hour ago
Yes, this storage would be growing exponentially making the disk space and latency problems harder (add the disaster recovery/backups). I think the choice of using client side is not too bad if you ensure that its secured properly. Also the company can excuse itself from the liability of storing sensitive data on its servers, thats a big deal in itself to be compliant for enterprise audits

1. The down side is that it cannot be used across the clients even for the same user

2. Using the same encryption key was a bad choice here, a per user key would have solved this issue for sure.

Groxxabout 1 hour ago
Fair (I haven't been using the encrypted-reasoning systems, though this is common in open ones - I'm kinda surprised it's an option in encrypted ones too), though what they're doing here is cross-user replays in addition to cross-model.
Der_Einzigeabout 1 hour ago
100% guaranteed that this research just forced this to happen now.

Sucks.

pas4 minutes ago
or add some metadata and don't allow downgrading.
x312about 2 hours ago
Super cool that this works. I'm surprised these companies re-use the same encryption key across models!

I wonder if you can use these for attacks, like this previous paper showing that if you know how a model reasons, you can "fake its thinking" to control it? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48631888

flexagoon34 minutes ago
> I'm surprised these companies re-use the same encryption key across models

I assume switching the model in the middle of a conversation is intended behavior (very useful in coding agents, for example)

yubblegumabout 1 hour ago
Seriously, what does it take to encrypt per session? There are many ways to make it scalable and efficient so I am wondering if this is left like this to allow interested 3rd parties ahem unobtrusively peek what people are doing with the AI.

(Thanks for the link. That’s an interesting idea!)

vhantz29 minutes ago
> For some AIME problems Opus 4.8 sometimes states the answer before deriving it. We find that the API summary does not always preserve this distinction, and can instead make the reasoning appear like a clean derivation.

No surprise here but good to have more confirmation that they just put all that in the training data. And based on the "reasoning", the models have some form of index of those problems (or they are HEAVILY trained on them).

throwa35626215 minutes ago
Didn't we see this with Fable 5 on multiple benchmarks?
vinaigretteabout 1 hour ago
I must say right of the bat this is the best research paper/working paper in regards to its styling. Beautiful
SwellJoeabout 1 hour ago
I agree on desktop/laptop, but on mobile there are images that appear under the text making it hard to read.
tanh39 minutes ago
So to make the APIs stateless (the "ideal" where they don't use server side sessions/etc) we ended up with this. I'm sorry but this is kind of hilarious. Given the salaries paid to the workers at these companies and the hype of the models, I can't believe they all fell to the same flaw.
nervaiabout 2 hours ago
Really cool work, you get the actual traces. Looks like the vendors can all reliably fix this one though.

A harder to defend against approach here where they work backwards from the results and ask the model to generate a plausible trace: How to Steal Reasoning Without Reasoning Traces https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.07267

benob44 minutes ago
A natural next step is to use the reasoning traces to jailbreak the stronger models (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.12277)
iamcoder18about 2 hours ago
This proves that OpenAI models reason in grug speak to save tokens! I wonder if open models are going to start doing that too to save on reasoning tokens.
kgeist33 minutes ago
In the BlackHat presentation on the HuggingFace incident, OpenAI showed some excerpts from the reasoning traces, and they had that grug speak too (skipped articles, etc.). So the OP's method must have indeed found the actual reasoning traces.
throwa35626210 minutes ago
This is laughable security. People claim security is now "solved" thanks to AI but from where I am standings it looks more like the fun 90ies making a return.

Anyway, can someone explain the part about K3? What are they trying to say?

qrios5 minutes ago
The interesting part is what they try to not to say: More indications for K3 is based on distillation from Claude and GPT.

From [1]:

> As you might guess, this suggests that distilling reasoning traces may have been possible for a long time without ever breaking the cryptography.

> An anecdote: we find that prefilling Kimi-K3 reasoning with a few tokens of Opus reasoning measurably shifts its response toward Opus’s

> A small memorization analysis showed that specific Claude and GPT reasoning spans are up to ~6 orders of magnitude easier to extract from Kimi-K3 than from the next-closest model.

[1] https://x.com/kotekjedi_ml/status/2087147042888114428?s=42

neuroelectron1 minute ago
Security is solved, but business needs overrides it
myworkaccount2about 1 hour ago
Is this how the eastern labs "distill" SOTA models?

If you can play it right, you don't even need to send suspicious prompts to the frontier models. Just use them for regular tasks, extract the encrypted COT blocks and replay it to a cheaper model to get the plain text COT.

But the real question is: Is it okay to steal from a thief's hoard?

NitpickLawyerabout 1 hour ago
> But the real question is: Is it okay to steal

By definition it cannot be stealing since you're paying for the tokens. It may be against their ToS, depending on what you end up doing with those tokens, but it cannot be stealing. If they charge by the token, all your tokens are belong to you :)

I also find it very strange that everyone sort of accepts their ToS like no big deal. Imagine MS using the same terms for their software - you cannot use any MS software to develop competing services. Bananas! They'd be dragged through the courts like it's the 90s.

(I get why they're doing it. Distillation is unreasonably effective. But still, I find it bananas that we've kinda accepted it, to the point where people use "stealing" or "attack" or any such terms)

desterothx12 minutes ago
I love how some of the biggest advancements in llms came from the Chinese labs, yet people still jump to distillation being unreasonably effective. Distillation is very good at creating smaller models from large ones sure, but nothing to me indicates it is 'unreasonably effective' compared to all the other bells and whistles being iterated on
tuesdaynightabout 1 hour ago
It's like sideloading. It's very hard to fight against the marketing budget of big tech
orbital-decay27 minutes ago
Not necessarily. There's a million ways to jailbreak any current model to show the trace and bypass all guardrails, or hijack and modify it. It's just one of them.
azinman2about 1 hour ago
The reasoning blocks are not stolen/mined from the internet at large directly. They’re the result of a lot of research, time, money, and expertise into creating a reasoning model. To me the answer is quite clearly no, especially when the encrypted blocks demonstrate they want to protect it.
pyrale28 minutes ago
Stuff available on the internet is also the result of a lot of research, time, money, and expertise. And AI companies taught us that it’s OK to yoink whatever is not bolted to the ground, even when it is illegal to do so.
tristanjabout 1 hour ago
No. There are dozens of companies that resell tokens at a discount to collect and resell session data to various Chinese labs.
elzbardico30 minutes ago
Most post-training tasks are based on real open source projects. A lot of time on real issues posted on issue trackers.

Besides that, the capabilities of a model are heavily dependent on the unsupervised learning phase, that gobbles all kind of other people's IP without giving a fuck. All the underpaid work behind the masses of third world programmers creating those post-training datasets would be completely uselless without it.

Also, it is kind of funny that labs resort to the "Research, time, money and expertise" argumet, when it is basically the same argument from publishers and other IP creator that the labs spent millions of dollars of lawyering money to resist. Besides, US law rejects in: Effort and cost by themselves not necessarely generate protectable interests.

About encryption, I think we're all contaminated by the bad ideology behind DMCA. While encryption established the intent, it doesn't follow that they have a legal claim of exclusivity just because of it.

Technically, you're overstating the value of so called "reasoning traces". You can't infer the verifier design, the reward shaping,or the data pipeline from them. Also, what you can extract are not the traces themselves, but the written summary of it, and you can't even guarantee that this summary reflects the exactly reasoning trace, models have show to have lied about it. Besides, distillation works when the student model already has strong priors, you can't turn a weak model in a SOTA with it. Don't believe Amodei's outrageous lies about it, he is just trying to exercise some regulatory capture.

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Cynddlabout 1 hour ago
> The providers did not acknowledge “any security implications arising from side channels or replay attacks.” All model providers acknowledged the receipt of our report and subsequently we were unable to launch the same attacks.

I went straight to the ‘Responsible Disclosure’ section. Not surprising, but still disappointing.

ziofillabout 1 hour ago
I understand it’s cool to have an artistic website, but it’s very noisy and non-accessible.

But very interesting result.

SwellJoeabout 1 hour ago
"Stealing" is a strong word to use for looking at the words produced by models built from the collective commons of the world.

And, honestly, being able to see how LLMs make decisions is critical to trust and security. I consider it a valuable feature, somewhat akin to seeing the source of software I use.

bonoboTP37 minutes ago
It's not stealing.
elzbardico26 minutes ago
OpenAI and Anthropic will probably now resort to save this server side, instead of relying on encription to be able to keep state on the client.
ramoz9 minutes ago
love the site design
fractorialabout 2 hours ago
Fascinating approach; however, a nightmare to scroll on mobile.
khalicabout 1 hour ago
This is beautiful work, congrats
Der_Einzigeabout 1 hour ago
The problem with this kind of excellent work is that the response to it is always to say "Fuck the user".

For example, when there was a paper that came out showing that having model logprobs makes distillation an order of magnitude easier, the closed LLM providers instantly yanked out support for getting the full logprobs at every time step. You get at most top 10 candidates now and I'm sure even that's on the chopping block.

People will use this to argue that a model which has exceeded Opus 4.8 (Kimi K3) somehow got most of its performance through distillation of Opus 4.8.

I still don't buy that distillation was worth more than 3 months of "catch up" time for the chinese labs. Most people who use the word "distillation" to much are revealing their sinophobia.

adrian_babout 1 hour ago
What I found the most interesting, and unfortunately not at all surprising, is that the reasoning of the LLMs frequently contained much more useful information than the actual answers, because the answers were censored.
elzbardico28 minutes ago
Dario is a cunning business man that won't hesitate to say whatever the fuck he needs to get the US government to exercise some regulatory capture to favor anthropic.
dborehamabout 2 hours ago
Can someone tell us how they were able to decrypt the encrypted payload? The article says they inserted the cyphertext into a session with a different model. Ok, but how does that allow you to decrypt it?
sidsudabout 1 hour ago
From what I got, the weaker model (Haiku in this case) has access to the shared key and the user simply asks to "transcribe the injected reasoning".
crazyloggerabout 1 hour ago
Anthropic server decrypts it as part of fulfilling every request, and haiku recites it per your request.
x312about 2 hours ago
The provider decrypts it and puts the decrypted reasoning into the model's context window. They prompt the model to repeat back the reasoning. So then the model echoes it back in plain text.
dboreham35 minutes ago
Hmm, ok. So the attack doesn't involve decrypting the payload, only getting the server to do so. Since a model will do that if you just ask, what's so special about the attack?
desterothx7 minutes ago
The large models whose thinking traces are useful are safeguarded against this reasoning replaying. the small models are just designed for speed and efficiency, so these safeguards are a lot meaker, making the attack possible
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alansaberabout 2 hours ago
Neat.
quantumgarbageabout 3 hours ago
Proprietary reasoning can be recovered from its encrypted traces. Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google return encrypted chain-of-thought blocks to clients that can be replayed across sessions, users, and models. We take a trace produced by a frontier model, replay it into a weaker sibling, jailbreak the weaker model, and recover the stronger model’s hidden reasoning in plaintext, without ever attacking the stronger model directly or triggering its anti-distillation safeguards.
the_afabout 2 hours ago
Why do you restate the abstract? Anyone can read it from the link.
ronsorabout 2 hours ago
This is Hacker News. You know people don't follow links and read.
Groxxabout 1 hour ago
It's rather common for posters to make a very small summary in a comment. It can help fight the floods of comments working off the title alone (though it's not particularly needed here for that purpose, imo)
mschuster91about 2 hours ago
People don't read no links no more
happybox2016about 1 hour ago
The real issue is that API providers log everything. OpenAI/Anthropic already capture full CoT traces in their logs — they just don't expose them. Distillation via API is just making explicit what they already have.