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59% Positive

Analyzed from 1712 words in the discussion.

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#access#dram#amd#controller#llm#https#run#com#registers#read

Discussion (50 Comments)Read Original on HackerNews

MattSteelbladeabout 2 hours ago
I cannot wait for the accompanying Black Hat talk. Christopher Domas is one of my absolute favorite all-time hackers. He does such a fantastic job of explaining his work. Some of my favorite talks of his:

- Psychological Warfare in Reverse Engineering https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HlUe0TUHOIc

- The MoVfuscator https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R7EEoWg6Ekk

- Hardware Backdoors in redacted x86 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmTwlEh8L7g

Haszabout 2 hours ago
If this is the same dude I am thinking of, his wife is also the CISO of Mozilla and do security research together, afair they have a whole book on x86 reverse engineering.

Very cool!

jambalaya8about 1 hour ago
His stuff is something else.
WhiteDawn9 minutes ago
This is all great to get full unfettered access to your own system, as life should be.

I’m sure Xbox and PlayStation security groups are a little nervous right now though. Getting ring-0 on those machines is near impossible, but once you do then everything else becomes wide open

dzdtabout 2 hours ago
So on an affected system, ring 0 root has access to pretty much everything that was hidden in negative ring territory. The page is pretty quiet about what other processor families might be similar beyond this specific AMD16h (an older AMD low-power family)?
m1elabout 1 hour ago
from the GH page: > Developed and tested on AMD Family 16h CPUs, the last generation whose datasheets document the DRAM controller's translation registers — and show that they can't be locked. 17h and beyond simply leave this information out.
embedding-shapeabout 2 hours ago
As long as you know the controller's translation registers, it's applicable? Not tested on later one's merely because the information wasn't readily available it seems.

> Developed and tested on AMD Family 16h CPUs, the last generation whose datasheets document the DRAM controller's translation registers — and show that they can't be locked. 17h and beyond simply leave this information out.

gmueckl39 minutes ago
OK, so this works on AMD Jaguar according to the README. That's a architecture from 2013. There's notes about Zen 3 having a different base address for the memory controller registers, but that's it. What newer CPUs does attack actually work on?
devttyeu20 minutes ago
Zen has completely different memory controller IP (UMC), that's configured at boot by AGESA/PSP. I doubt this exploit applies to modern Zen CPUs, however AMD are the only ones who could really confirm this.
CartwheelLinux32 minutes ago
That information is intentionally left out
gmueckl19 minutes ago
Then publishing it in this incomplete state is just pointless fearmongering and will just make others fill in this information within the next couple of days. And the good guys likely won't be the first ones to do that.
doogliusabout 1 hour ago
I don't understand the threat model being attacked here. If you had physical DRAM access you could do all of this anyway right? And I would assume that an unprivileged user would not have write access to the DRAM controller registers?
fulafel20 minutes ago
This doesn't require physical DRAM access, it's all software.

With ring-0 access, this lets you poke "even things walled off and invisible to ring-0 or the CPU itself" including things that the security processor tries hard to wall off.

quotemstr40 minutes ago
Even physical DRAM access would be thwarted by transparent mandatory memory encryption, so this hack is still something else.
devttyeuabout 1 hour ago
The big question is whether this can break out of KVM and whether it can be microrode patched / patched in any other way.

And whether it's really real in the first place.

quotemstr39 minutes ago
This hack is 99% giving people the control over their own computers they should already have had. Guy is a Robin Hood.
summa_techabout 1 hour ago
One hopes that a hypervisor would not expose hardware control registers directly in the first place, except ones deliberately designed for virtualization support.

Otherwise, the guest is running effectively at the same privilege level as the hypervisor (that's useful sometimes, but probably not intended in most applications).

devttyeuabout 1 hour ago
Yeah, just started looking at this with my team (we run a cloud with VM instance offering on AMD so this very much caught our eye)

So far seems this is about right:

1. You need platform register access, so seems can't KVM-escape with just this

2. Big question is what about breaking Confidential SEV-SNP guests from the host?

devttyeuabout 1 hour ago
Ok, on 2. and in general this exploit only works on pre-Zen AMD platforms as the repo states in not-so-clear terms.

Zen changed DTC (DRAM Controller) to UMC (Unified Memory Controller), UMC is programmed at boot, and one would hope they figured that locking access to it makes sense when they were adding confidential compute support; Not clear though because there is no public documentation on it, so best we can hope for is some statement from AMD/3rd party researcher saying "this won't work on Zen because X/Y/Z"

ipdashcabout 1 hour ago
I really hate to be that guy, but man, as someone who was and is a big Christopher Domas fan (and is way dumber than him, I mean, this stuff is seriously over my head)... it's been really disappointing to see him LLM'ing all the READMEs recently. They used to be a joy to read through, but now the Claudeisms made it such a slog I could barely get through a few paragraphs. I'm glad he's using the new tools to get even more cool stuff done, but I wish he'd have gone for a human writeup at the end.
BugsJustFindMe44 minutes ago
I find vague gestures like this almost more annoying than the idea of someone using AI to write.

> the Claudeisms

This is hand-waving. Please be more specific.

> made it such a slog

On the flip-side, I didn't find it a slog at all. What if you're wrong?

austinthetaco38 minutes ago
I'm not the person you are replying to, but the readme is very clearly written by an AI, and it sounds nothing like his older work. Sometimes it's just super clear to people something is written with AI without you getting some sort of singular "gotcha" word or indicator. It's just writing patterns that would be hard to clearly establish rules for here in an HN comment, but it's incredibly obvious when you learn to spot it.
gnyman16 minutes ago
I recently vibed a little linked-in AI detector which looks for AI things like rule of three and scores it. It scored it 97% AI polished.

My gut feeling agrees. The rule of three is one of the stronger signals, can't stamp that out of the AI even if you wanted :-)

I'll push it to GH later, it's nothing fancy but it has been quite good in my experience. Here is highlights which it used

``` tricolon coordinated VERB run: “…break / on them collapse / unlock everything .” (3 members) tricolon coordinated VERB run: “…guard physical addresses / not DRAM coordinates / you rearrange the” (3 members) tricolon coordinated NOUN run: “…handful of data / it to z3 / the translation matrix” (3 members) tricolon coordinated NOUN run: “…view / the elaborate fences / locks / security checks the” (4 members) tricolon coordinated VERB run: “…Read it / the alias map / pipe” (3 members) ```

boxed26 minutes ago
I mean, it's super clear to a lot of people that it's written by LLMs EVEN WHEN IT'S NOT. You can't vibe that shit too.
jchw15 minutes ago
"What if you're wrong?"

I'd just like to address this real quick because some people seem to think this is just a "hunch" that has some probability of being false; there is absolutely nothing more certain on planet Earth than the LLM involvement in this writing. It is difficult to come up with things that are certain enough to compare this to to convey the lack of doubt that exists.

I am not going to make fun of you for not being able to tell, although I do find it surprising that people seem to struggle in both directions with telling AI and human writing apart (are our brains really that different?) - I just want it to be clear that some of us can pick up Claudisms within just a couple of sentences with no effort. A Claude-generated sentence, in isolation, may not ring any alarm bells. A few of them in a row, however, that's a load-bearing smoking gun right there.

We can certainly argue to what extent undisclosed LLM involvement is an issue or not, though frankly I don't like reading LLM writeups so I would greatly prefer if people would stop using LLMs for public facing documents. But, it is at least worth making this much clear: we can tell.

jonathrg9 minutes ago
The only other reasonable explanation would be that he has consumed so much LLM content that the machine has erased his voice and replaced it with its own.
ipdashc20 minutes ago
> Please be more specific.

The em dashes are the most obvious stereotypical tell, but that doesn't really matter that much (I actually like them and occasionally used them pre-AI). It's hard to put a finger on, but the most annoying LLMism to me is the overdramatic, staccato, almost "epic" way they talk. It feels like a 2009 lens flare effect over everything, it sounds like a stereotypical hacker in a CSI show.

> the last generation whose datasheets document the DRAM controller's translation registers — and show that they can't be locked

> When your code dereferences *p, it appears to access the DRAM at p. It does not — p is a virtual address

> Physical addresses are really more of a suggestion.

> That's the exploit. All of it.

The worst part is that this stuff is genuinely cool and deserves to be dramatic. And I like stereotypical, campy hacker speak! But LLMs are, IDK... bad at it? Or maybe it just becomes a bore to read the same. Exact. Dramatic. Voice. From literally everyone. After you've heard it enough times.

None of this is against Mr. Domas. He seems like a cool person, with a cool voice, and I want to read his voice, not Claude's.

> What if you're wrong?

I definitely could be! Apologies if I am. But with all the em dashes and such, and having read his previous work, I felt confident enough to mention it. And as the sibling comment says, it really is something you just learn to spot over time.

cgyvbunji12 minutes ago
It's the ASCII diagrams for me. Although I hesitate to point it out because they are usually helpful unlike the em dashes. Before LLMs, ASCII diagrams in readmes were a half baked mess, if one were present at all. Now every project has at least one perfectly made ASCII diagram - instant LLM tell.
fulafelabout 2 hours ago
Fascinating. So what is the DCT swizzling functionality designed for in the hardware originally?
Retr0idabout 1 hour ago
Without any swizzling, certain common access patterns can end up with subpar performance, for example walking the columns of a 2d array with a certain stride - if it ends up directing every access to the same bank on the same channel, the throughput is much lower than if the load was evenly distributed across multiple banks/channels.

Swizzling "randomizes" bank/rank/channel distribution, which makes unlucky access patterns less likely. (Something I'd like to research is microbenchmarking different access patterns to infer the swizzle pattern and defeat physical ASLR)

mschuster91about 2 hours ago
The researcher behind this is obviously highly knowledgeable in reverse engineering CPUs to the tune it reminds me of the dwarves digging in Moria...

But why on earth do they have to use AI to write their writeups?!

russdillabout 1 hour ago
Seriously. Got tired of reading the same idea over and over reworded endlessly.
dcrazyabout 1 hour ago
I got suspicious but decided it wasn’t AI. The “Foo is the bar.” sentence construct is coherent with the overall “through the looking glass” tenor.
jchwabout 1 hour ago
Nah, it's not just that, literally all the stuff they've posted this year is obvious LLM writing, none of the stuff from previous years is. To get this close to LLM writing style without actually using an LLM, you would pretty much have to be purposefully trying.

But I have a new favorite way of demonstrating this:

https://github.com/search?q=owner%3Axoreaxeaxeax+load-bearin...

Guess how many of these are from before 2025.

quotemstr41 minutes ago
This is the level of access the rightful owner of a computer should have to his own system.

He should also be able to fuse away this access forever, to be fair. But out of the box, when I get a new laptop, I should be able to read and write every byte of DRAM.

aecsocketabout 2 hours ago
Holy shit, Christopher Domas is back. I remember watching his Defcon talks on x86 shenanigans[^1][^2] and being amazed at what he's been able to discover. Then he got whisked away by Intel and now drops this. I'm excited.

[^1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XH0F9r0siTI

[^2]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jmTwlEh8L7g

vientabout 1 hour ago
He also released another research just a few days ago https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49245491
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Retr0idabout 2 hours ago
Holy crap. This is like a software-reachable version of the dynamic memory aliasing hardware attack demonstrated by https://batteringram.eu/
UltraSaneabout 1 hour ago
Opus refuses to discuss this at all. Make of that what you will.
devttyeuabout 1 hour ago
Well, K3 has no problem, Sol is also fine-ish
HanClintoabout 1 hour ago
Likewise -- also had zero issues going over this with Sol. Seemed to give solid advice for how to test it -- use an expendable bare-metal AMD family 16h test system w/ usual standard checks that apply.

> Run `platform_check` first and do not use `SKITTER_FORCE=1` casually. Start with the read-only `dram_state` and `dram_carveouts`, then `dram_dump --dry-run`. Avoid `dram_poke` until maps have been freshly collected and calibrated. Do not bypass fingerprint checks, calibration, fencing, or verification.

Claude's (apparently externally-mandated?) lobotomization continues to be concerning. :-/

FabHKabout 1 hour ago
Could someone ELI5 please? Context, achievement, scope, consequences?