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Discussion (30 Comments)Read Original on HackerNews
>There a malicious struct.py shadows Python’s standard implementation
I ran into this myself, where some file I had given a random name turned out to shadow some Python standard library module, giving me the weirdest startup crash ever.
That definitely doesn't seem to me like how that should be designed, magically silently importing everything you see and overriding basic functionality.
It is quite sneaky how LLM output can sometimes bypass human verification like that. No one is going around checking every single line change in auto-generated files. Someone could easily sneak a malicious dependency in there through some online tutorial that the LLM searches for.
But it's real easy to give auto mode instructions (like "always ask before deploy") and then bypass that just normally.
The solution is to update the python flags to include `-I`, so that python will run in an isolated mode.
<rant>
This is relates to my frustration with how PEP-668 was implemented. Python has long had a problem with accidental overwriting of system libraries. If you `sudo python -mpip install foo`, then that can interact very poorly with your distro's `sudo apt-get install python-foo`, since pip would add/remove files that were expected to be managed solely through `apt-get`.
But in adding a warning to prevent this, they also applied the same warning to `~/.local/pythonX.Y/site-packages`, which is where traditionally a user would install additional packages with `python -mpip --local foo`. The argument is that since this is part of the import path of `/usr/bin/python`, it belongs to the system's python installation, so installation to the user's site-packages should also be blocked. This is a sleight of hand that changes the goal of PEP-668 from "avoid conflicts in file ownership" to "ensure an isolated python environment for system tools".
If I were to accept their argument that /usr/bin/python's imports should only be affected by distro-managed installations, then I should also be prevented from making any `*.py` files anywhere. After all, if those were in the working directory, they would be imported. This is clearly ridiculous, and so I don't buy the argument that breaking user-level site-packages is justified in order to have an isolated system-level python.
The correct solution would be for distro-managed programs to use `#!/usr/bin/python -I` as their shebang instead of `#!/usr/bin/python`, so they would actually get an isolated environment. Instead, PEP-668 needlessly broke user-level site-packages, and didn't even solve the problem that it set out to do.
</rant>
See, that's why you should run with --dangerously-skip-permissions
Jokes, aside running with dangerously-skip-permissions is really handy, and I have found that I cannot be trusted to vet commands and code, and guess that automode is only marginally better than a human, and the cost of false positives is too high for my workflow.
So skipping permissions is where we are at, and disallowing network access seems to be the way to go.
> I got attack success rates up to 80% using a small sample size.
Snake oil salesman misrepresents the data. Color me surprised! /s