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https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-31431 "Moderate severity", "Fix deferred"
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31431
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-31431
https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-31431.html
https://ubuntu.com/security/cves/about#priority
> Medium: A significant problem, typically exploitable for many users. Includes network daemon denial of service, cross-site scripting, and gaining user privileges.
> High: A significant problem, typically exploitable for nearly all users in a default installation of Ubuntu. Includes serious remote denial of service, local root privilege escalations, local data theft, and data loss.
Too many darn acronyms. This one wasn't too hard to figure out from context but I wish people would define acronyms before using them!
https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/40741 (gcc version "Red Hat 14.3" included in system version at the bottom)
https://docs.oracle.com/en/database/oracle/tuxedo/22/otxig/s...
Indeed. "Distributions we directly verified: RHEL 14.3". Directly verified by me to be AI slop (the release page at least).
https://access.redhat.com/articles/red-hat-enterprise-linux-...
> Talk to our security experts
(at the bottom of the page)
I have a sneaking suspicion his first name is Claude. Don't get me wrong though, he is pretty good I hear.
> Update your distribution's kernel package to one that includes mainline commit a664bf3d603d
But it isn't very clear to me what Kernel version you can expect that to be in. For Arch/CachyOS, the patch seems to be included in 6.18.22+, 6.19.12+ and 7.0+. If you're on any of the lower versions in the same upstream stable series, you're likely vulnerable right now. Some distro kernels may include the fix in other versions, so check for your distribution.
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31431
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-31431
Also, disabling algif_aead is suggested as mitigation
> Before you can patch: disable the algif_aead module.
> echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf
> rmmod algif_aead 2>/dev/null || true
Edit: and I can confirm that on my system with kernel 6.19.8 the above fixes the exploit.
I ran the exploit in rootless Podman, and predictably it doesn't escape the container.
They also claim their script "roots every Linux distribution shipped since 2017.", but only tested four; and it doesn't work on Alpine
they state that the write-up is forthcoming. presumably there is some additional steps or modifications that will be detailed in the 'part 2'.
"Next: "From Pod to Host," how Copy Fail escapes every major cloud Kubernetes platform."
The details will depend on whether the kernel is a newer release or a maintenance version of an older release.
Anybody has the same feeling?
Looking at their source code [1] it starts with this simple line:
import os as g,zlib,socket as s
And already I'm perplexed. "os as g"? but we're not aliasing "zlib as z"? Clearly this is auto-generated by some kind of minimizer? Likely because zlib is called only once, and os multiple times. As a code author/reviewer, I would never write "os as g" and I would absolutely never approve review of any code that used this.
Anyway, I could go on. :) Let's just stop fetishizing byte count
[1] https://github.com/theori-io/copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431/blob/m...
Where do you see this "fetishizing" happening most often? It's a strange thing to counter-fetishize about.
From a Busy Beaver, 256-bytes compo, or Dwitter perspective, 732 bytes isn’t really that meaningful.
And the sample exploit is even optimizing the byte size by using zlib compression, which doesn’t make much sense for the purpose. It just emphasizes the byte count fetishization.
But the fact that it's not a kernel-exec LPE and it's reliable across kernels and distributions is important; it's close to the maximum "exploitability" you're going to see with an LPE. Which the page does communicate effectively; it just gilds the lily.
But the bug is real and people should patch :)
For the size: sometimes people will shove in kilobytes of offset tables or something into an exploit, so it'll fingerprint and then look up details to work. This is much smaller because it doesn't need any of that, which is important for severity. (I agree the "golf" nature is a bit of an aside, kind of like pwn2own exploits taking "10 seconds")
"The honest solution: a clean 50-line cut" and so on, ad nauseam
How often do you review, and subsequently block the release, of PoCs in this sort of context? Sounds like you've faced this a lot.
I always thought code quality mattered less in those, as long as you communicate the intent.
If you have a choice between pointing out the byte size of the exploit, and not pointing out the byte size of the exploit, pointing it out is virtually always the wrong choice.
In both cases, doing the right thing is less work. So somebody is going the extra way to ensure they are doing it wrong. If they didn't care, they'd end up doing it right by default.
How does "import os as g" communicate the intent? How does hiding the payload behind zlib communicate the intent? This is the opposite: obfuscating the intent, so they can brag about 732 bytes instead of 846 bytes (or whatever it might have been).
It would have been less work for everyone involved to just release the unminified source.
"Just" is doing a lot of work there, I'm so annoyed reading it.
It's like an anti-ad and they had pretty cool material to work with.
* Claude loves stacatto "Some numeric figure. Something else. Intensifier" (ex. the "exploitable for a decade." or whatever sentences)
Then go on. zlib is only used once, so "zlib as z" in exchange for using z once doesn't get you anything. Using os directly and not renaming it g saves you 2 bytes though. But in this age where AI outputs reams of code at the drop of a hat, why shouldn't we enjoy how small you can get it to pop a root shell?
https://gist.github.com/fragmede/4fb38fb822359b8f5914127c2fe...
edit: If we drop offset_src=0 and just pass in 0 positionally, it comes down to 720.
Because I want to know what the exploit is doing and how it works, and if it's even safe to run.
A privesc PoC is NOT the place for this kind of fun.
Which I guess is true but I would like to verify the attack is the intended one
lucky for them, its an exploit script, not enterprise code.
all that needs to be "reviewed" is whether or not it exploits the thing its supposed to.
edit: yall really think a 10-line proof of concept script needs to undergo a code review? wild. i shouldnt be surprised that the top comment on a cool LPE exploit is complaining about variable naming
Maybe you didn't care, but the length of this comment chain clearly shows that it matters. Effective communication is just as important as the engineering.
i just dont understand huffing and puffing over "os as g" in a 10-line poc script, and saying "well i would never approve this". its not enterprise code. its not code that will ever be used anywhere else, for anything. its sole purpose is to prove that the exploit is real, which it does!
the rest of the information is in the actual vulnerability report. the poc is a courtesy to the reportee, so that they can confirm that the report itself isnt bullshit.
evidently, given the downvotes i am getting, people think exploit scripts should be enterprise quality code. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ half of the reports i see flowing through mailing lists dont even have a poc.
amazingly HN-like to be upset about a variable name
Unfortunately it fails on calling bind() on my device, so probalby Android doesn't ship with that kenrel module by default :(. So no freedom for my $40 phone.
Putting it out here, maybe somebody else will have better luck.
[1] https://gist.github.com/alufers/921cd6c4b606c5014d6cc61eefb0...
Traceback (most recent call last): File "/data/data/com.termux/files/home/exploit.py", line 8, in <module> f=g.open("/usr/bin/su",0);i=0;e=zlib.decompress(d("78daab77f57163626464800126063b0610af82c101cc7760c0040e0c160c301d209a154d16999e07e5c1680601086578c0f0ff864c7e568f5e5b7e10f75b9675c44c7e56c3ff593611fcacfa499979fac5190c0c0c0032c310d3")) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ FileNotFoundError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/usr/bin/su'
Not using setuid anywhere means you'd have to build a slightly more clever exploit, but it's still trivial - just modify some binary you know will run as root "soon".
But... I didn't check, but IIRC the untrusted_app secontext that apps run in is not allowed to open AF_ALG sockets - so you can't directly trigger the vulnerability as a malicious app. Although it might be possible in some roundabout way (requesting some more privileged crypto service to do so).
~~My allegedly fully patched pixel 8 pro allowed an AF_ALG socket to open under termux without virtualization so I'm not sure the last but is true~~
Does this mean you can go from a basic web shell from a shared hosting account to root? I can see how that could wreak havoc really quickly.
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31431
You can also call it Debian 13.
https://xint.io/blog/copy-fail-linux-distributions
i bet if i told you their names, you would instantly know what vulns those are.
its easier to talk about things with names. it hurts no one. it takes approximately no effort or time.
CVEs are, for whatever reason, like the only thing on the planet that people seem to have a problem with when they receive a name. i am not sure why.
What, you guys talk about books based on their “title” instead of just memorising the ISBN of each book? Pssh, count me disappointed!
Very few CVE’s get names dedicated to them like this, because usually when they do - it is very serious, as in this case.
On this bright side, does this mean Magisk is coming to all unpatched Android phones?
Password: su: Authentication token manipulation error
I'm guessing this means it's already patched?
you are reading about it now because it has been patched.
Ubuntu before 26.04 LTS (released a week ago) are currently listed as vulnerable.
Debian other than forky and sid are currently listed as vulnerable.
This is a disgrace.
This is usable anywhere on an affected Kernel version
This is why I compile my own kernel. I disable things I don't use. If it's not present it can't hurt you.
> block AF_ALG socket creation via seccomp regardless of patch state.
Likewise I use seccomp to only allow syscalls that are necessary. Everything else is disabled. In the programs I have that need to connect to a backend socket, that is done, and then socket creation is disabled.
> Yes — it's on this page. We held it for a month while distros prepared patches; the major builds are out as of this writing.
There is no update available for Ubuntu 24, PoC works and just tried updating.