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The piece walks through what the original architecture was, why it worked (Microsoft's volume licensing commitments nearly tripled in the two years following launch, $1.9B to $5.5B), and why the 2026 unwind is structurally different. The 2001 transition gave partners a defined advisory role with a sustainable economic model. The 2026 transition does not.
Happy to take questions on the architecture, the design decisions, the pieces that worked and the pieces I'd do differently, or how this maps to adjacent industries. Insurance brokerage M&A is currently following a parallel consolidation pattern, which is interesting because insurance was one of the two industries I studied when designing the ESA model in 1998.
If any specific claim needs sourcing, flag it and I'll respond with primary-source citations.
Brendan
Discussion (7 Comments)Read Original on HackerNews
I fail to see how this is a win for the vast majority of folks impacted by the licensing process...
Can we get TL;Don't Have MBA summary?
Under the prior Enterprise Agreement structure, Microsoft would basically sell licenses to channel partners at decreasing costs based on KPIs like volume. This works for physical goods where big vendors get bigger discounts for bigger volume commitments, but leaves a lot of money on the table for software vendors while making it difficult for channel partners to compete with established players (who in turn can bully software makers into more lucrative terms).
So Microsoft - or the author, rather - moved to the Software Assurance model: everyone fits into the same tiers depending on size, and everyone gets the same margins. This changes incentives to reward bundling, multi-year deals, and broader portfolios of software instead of just straight volume. Putting everyone on equal footing for comp also incentivizes services - MSPs, consulting, architecture, etc - which then also feeds into the original incentives of growing multi-year deals and broader portfolio adoption, hence the “Perpetual Motion Machine” comment attributed to Ballmer.
Except Microsoft now feels they’re such the dominant player in the market that they can handle billing outright, relegating partners solely to advisors and consultants in an era where Microsoft sells the very services partners used to make bank on. This is cutting out the middleman (channel partners), but also exposed Microsoft to a litany of government regulation as a result. This is because the SA model concentrates pricing in Microsoft’s hands, and thus gives them outsized power and influence in the market.
That’s my understanding as an outsider though; I fully admit I am likely wrong on some points that OP might be able to clarify or correct.
Web-Shows with dumb number animations showing Billions is really funny.
I guess the tech industry hasnt figured out that we know this is all BS. The rule that always rules still applies:
The only way to get someone to use your software is to FORCE them to. Thankfully I dont have to use their software anymore.