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Discussion (31 Comments)Read Original on HackerNews
but if the thing can be interacted with, it can usually be mapped and defined and then named. But there will always be things which do not have names, at least in mathematics -- think of the real numbers.
This reminds me of a YouTube video I watched this week titled "A counting argument for why mind comes before matter": https://youtu.be/AtduNjJV-6E?is=nBZ9ztZsyeoVhCj1
The argument is something like the set of possible thoughts about physical objects is larger than the physical objects themselves. It feels similar in flavor to the idea of unameable objects.
There's something special about a name. The name of the God of the Bible is special. Christians are to call upon _the name_ of the Lord. We pray, hallowed by _thy name_. It is somehow denotes the summary essence of the thing being named, even if it doesn't give specific details of its characteristics.
There are some that unnameable with my mathematical understanding, but that's not saying much.
On the other hand, given any real number, I can name it. I'll run out of unique names, since no injective function exists from real numbers to names.
So, some unnamed real numbers will always remain (non-constructively), I can make real numbers that escape a naming scheme (constructively), and no unnameable real numbers exist.
People tell you that you can connect more or less everyone by 6 degrees. But what struck me was, for anyone you try this with, you know their names, so you've already restricted yourself in how far out someone can be.
That ordering is not a well-ordering, which is what the GP specified. A well ordering requires that every non-empty subset has a smallest element. That's not true for the reals ordered by x < y: for example, the set of all reals > 0 has no smallest element.
No one has explicitly shown that the reals can be well ordered, but it's a consequence of the axiom of choice that every set can be well-ordered. So in ZFC there must be a well ordering of the reals, even though no one has found one. Issues like this are why not all mathematicians accept the axiom of choice.
But then by describing it you are committing it to a set of conditions this unnameable thing satisfies.
But then if you go beyond a narrow interpretation of that paradox and accept that naming and describing are both accomplishing the same fundamental thing, that being committing a thing to a condition (like a name) or set of conditions (like a description), you do run into the same problem.
Hmm, interesting. Now back to this E2E testing stuff I've been avoiding.
I think there is some analogy to be made here.
Like what?
Oh wait…
The name that can be named is not the eternal name.
-- Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching
1) let x be a thing
2) I name x "Jeff"
3) all things are nameable (from 1 and 2)
another way to put this is that it's natural to take the paradox as a reductio.
Really, the blurb about "seems impossible to verify this by giving positive instances" contains the tension between constructive math and non-constructive math. Does an unnameable (and undefinable) thing actually exist? If a tree falls in a forest, but no one can hear it, does it make a sound?
For that matter, the paradox is self-resolving. By labeling the entities it is concerned with as "unnameable things", it has named them. As a collection, entities not otherwise named can be simply referred to as "Bhartrhari's things".
Where is it a proof that there are many unnamed things ? I could only see it as an argument that there are no "unnameable" things.
This is the stuff of magic and folklore, and neatly resolved by Ursula K. LeGuin in _A Wizard of Earthsea_.